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4

The world of antitrust has changed dramatically from the
early days of Periclean Athens, when price-fixing grain dealers
were put to death.5 From its meager beginnings in the guise of the
4. The opinions expressed in this paper do not represent those of Holland &
Knight LLP, the United States Department of Justice, or their affiliates. The authors
would like to thank Professor Kenneth Elzinga of the University of Virginia, who has
inspired five decades of antitrust attorneys and scholars. We would also like to
acknowledge the late Professor Alan Swan of the University of Miami for his guiding
light and the editorial board of the Inter-American Law Review for unyielding
dedication.
5. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., The Evolving Architecture of InternationalTrade: The
Global Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Runaway
Regulation?, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 59, 60 (2002); see also R. Hewitt Pate,
Antitrust Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/204136.htm ("Little has changed over the last century in terms of the
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Sherman Act,6 the notion of antitrust enforcement has grown
exponentially in modem times.7 Society has become accustomed
to the proliferation of high-profile antitrust matters8 and the
degree to which competition laws continue to blow the delicate
winds of trade.9 As our world evolves into one global village, the
antitrust enforcement agencies and their respective governing
statutes and laws have become interwoven into a blanket laden
with novel means of curtailing unchecked competitive and trade
practices.

°

Not surprisingly, the United States has been at the helm of
the ship, steering our marketplace toward a land and an era in
which competition blossoms. 1 The antitrust laws and procedures
of the United States have become the global standard to which
both developed and developing nations hold themselves. At the
same time, the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice has remained vigilant of antitrust infractions committed abroad.12 DOJ press releases, replacing the well known
wording of our antitrust statutes. The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, and the
Clayton Act in 1914, and the legislative amendments since that time have been
minimal. Yet U.S. antitrust law has come a long way indeed in those years through
judicial interpretations of the law.").
6. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2009).
7. Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End, 48 SMU L. REV. 1749, 1754-55
("Antitrust law once reflected a political consensus informed by a general popular
distrust of private monopoly power. The popular consensus that launched the
antitrust movement and led to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act was
erected upon a rough political ideal of the social value of curbing the excesses of
private economic power.").
8. See generally F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
9. Some scholars have taken a "Darwinian" view of antitrust policy, arguing that
competition law should be focused more on efficiency rather than a general sentiment
against big business. See generally Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The Antitrust
Vision and Its Revisionist Critics, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 939, 942 (1990) (finding that
the Chicago School approach to antitrust is that, with the exception of price fixing, a
firm should be left to its own interests and it will then make the best choice for
consumers).
10. S. Lynn Diamond, Empagran, the FTAIA and Extraterritorial Effects:
Guidance to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31
BROOK. J.

INT'L L. 805, 809 (2006) ("With rampant globalization, instantaneous

communication, and multinationals building products with components from all over
the world and selling them far from where they are produced, it may be argued that
there no longer are independent, national markets.").
11. D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable)Law: Why Countries Enter Into
Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters In Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 231, 240 (2008) (describing antitrust as a regulatory tool to improve
societal well-being, correct market malfunctions, and evolved to a market-based
organization of the economy).
12. See generally R. Shyam Khemani and Ana Carrasco-Martin, The Investment
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perp-walk, 13 have bragged of foreign defendants agreeing to confinement in U.S. prisons and the payment of substantial fines to
the U.S. government for conduct committed abroad, involving foreign corporations, and often bearing relatively little nexus to the
United States. 4
A consequence of transnational economic activity in a progressively more universal world is the extraterritorial application
of antitrust laws and policy to business transactions that affect
foreign lands.15 Despite a healthy array of opinions by the U.S.
Supreme Court, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and District Courts,
the federal courts have taken to the famed words of French philosopher Rene Descartes: "Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum" ("I doubt,
therefore I think, therefore I am."). In a peculiarly circuitous
path, jurists have largely refrained from orating on a precise definition of "substantial effects." "6 The jurisprudence has fundamentally glossed over the effect required for the application of U.S.
antitrust laws and the granting of jurisdiction by federal courts.
Replete with recent examples, this article examines the origins of
the substantial effects test from its inception in the middle of the
20th century to the curvaceous road that lies ahead. We treat
enforcement between the Americas with particular emphasis,
bearing in mind our unique geographic nexus.
This article proceeds as follows. Section II presents an introduction to the current state of U.S. competition law, from its early
Climate, Competition Policy, and Economic Development in Latin America, 83 CI.
KENT L. REv. 67 (2008).
13. See Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The "perp walk"-as it
is popularly known-is a widespread police practice in New York City in which the
suspected perpetrator of a crime, after being arrested, is "walked" in front of the press

so that he can be photographed or filmed.").
14. See, e.g., Dep't of Justice Press Release, British Hose Manufacturer Agrees to
Plead Guilty and Pay $4.5 Million for Participating in Worldwide Bid-rigging
Conspiracy (Dec. 1, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_
releases/2008/239884.htm (stating that corporate defendant that manufactures
marine hose in England agreed to pay $4.54 million dollar fine for conspiracy in the
"off-shore extraction."); Dep't of Justice Press Release, Former British Airways
Executive Agrees to Plead Guilty to Participating in Price-Fixing Conspiracy on Air
Cargo Shipments (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_
releases/2008/237809.htm (stating that British national, who was former Commercial
General Manager for British Airways World Cargo, agreed to serve eight months in
prison in the United States for participating in meetings, conversations and
communications that resulted in higher air cargo rates in the United States).
15. See generally Carlos Di Ponio, Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict: An
Assessment of the ExtraterritorialApplication and Enforcement of Competition Laws
in Canada and the United States, 13 MIcH. ST. J. INT'L L. 283, 283 (2005).
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
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inception to the complex web of evolution today. Section III
describes the existing legal scholarship on the international
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. Section IV traces through the
early history of American antitrust jurisprudence and details the
development of the substantial effects test through the 20th century. Section V provides analysis and discussion about the manner in which the substantial effects test bears upon criminal
enforcement, the private plaintiffs bar, civil enforcement by the
United States, and what lies beyond the breaking waves of the
current sea. Section VI briefly opines as to thoughts for research.
Finally, the conclusion is found in section VII.

II.

THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST LAW

&

POLICY

U.S. antitrust laws17 have long been regarded as a forceful
statement of American economic policy."8 The notion of antitrust
law and policy grew out of a weary suspicion and concern for the
enormous trusts 9 that were cultivated in the 19th century by corporations seeking to conceal true business arrangements." While
the federal antitrust law originated in the Sherman Act of 1890,21
many jurists and scholars view the words as merely a congres22
sional mandate to develop a federal common law of competition.
The Act was left vague to vest the judiciary with substantial
responsibility for the interpretation.2 3 The Sherman Act prohibits
17. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2009), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1994), and the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a
(2004) form the three significant U.S. antitrust laws.
18. Note, A Most Private Remedy: Foreign Party Suits and the U.S. Antitrust
Laws, 114 HnAv. L. REV. 2122, 2124 (2001) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985) (The Supreme Court has
consistently emphasized "the fundamental importance to American democratic
capitalism of the regime of the antitrust laws.").
19. At the time of the passage of the Sherman Act, "trust" referred to monopolistic
behavior; many monopolies created trusts to maintain their businesses. The trusts
provided a means for cartel members to enforce monopolistic practices.
20. Robert L. Bradley, Jr., On the Originsof the Sherman Antitrust Act, 9 CATO. J.
737, 737-38 (1990) ("[Tlhe passage of the Sherman Act was motivated by widespread
hostility toward monopoly-considered to be detrimental to the interests of consumers
and small business and also antithetical to democratic institutions."), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj9n3/cj9n3-13.pdf.
21. Chapter 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(2009)).
22. Rudolph J. Peritz, Frontiersof Legal Thought I: A Counter-HistoryofAntitrust
Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 263, 269 (1990).
23. Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself
Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare, and Antitrust Law, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 449,
449 (2008).
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business arrangements in restraint of trade (Section 1) and
attempts to monopolize (Section 2).24 Despite the statute's clear
wording prohibiting "every contract, combination.., or conspiracy
in restraint of trade, 25 thousands of cases have progressed
through the evolving jurisprudence of the Sherman Act to produce
the contemporary understanding that applies to unreasonable
restraints. Numerous scholars have pointed to the promotion of26
efficient allocation of economic resources set by the Sherman Act.
Nearly a quarter century after the passage of the Sherman
Act, the U.S. Congress responded to the growing fears of monopolies and anticompetitive practices by passing the Clayton Act.27
This Act was driven in large part by the Sherman Act's deficiencies in providing individuals with causes of action for antitrust
infractions." The Clayton Act was designed to supplement the
Sherman Act and provides for the advancement of competition by
addressing the following four areas: (1) outlawing the use of price
discrimination between different purchasers where the pricing
29
significantly weakens competition or tends to create a monopoly;
(2) prohibiting "exclusive dealings" by which a sale is made contingent upon a buyer agreeing not to work with a competitor, and the
"exclusive dealing" results in significantly weakened competition
or a "tying arrangement" in which the sale is made contingent
upon the buyer agreeing to purchase a second product, and where
the result substantially harms competition; 0 (3) proscribing mergers and acquisitions that result in substantially lessened competition, and (4) forbidding one person from being a director of two or
24. Sherman Act of 1890, Chapter 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2009); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)
("[tihe Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.").
25. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
26. Note, supra note 18, at 2125 ("Not only do the antitrust laws purportedly yield
the most efficient allocation of economic resources, producing both the lowest possible
prices and the highest quality for the greatest number, they simultaneously provide
an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social
institutions." (citing Terry Calvani, What is the Objective of Antitrust?, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 7, 8 n.7, 12-13 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d

ed. 1988) and quoting Northern Pacific Railway, 356 U.S. at 4 (internal quotations
omitted))).
27. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
28. See Jaafar A. Riazi, FindingSubject Matter Jurisdictionover Antitrust Claims
of ExtraterritorialOrigin: Whether the Seventh Circuit's Approach Properly Balances
Policies ofInternationalComity and Deterrence, 54 DEPAuL L. REV. 1277, 1280 (2005).
29. Clayton Act, Section 2, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13.
30. Clayton Act, Section 3, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14.
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more competing corporations.3 1 The Act provides for enforcement
by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice, as well as by private parties. The
Clayton Act also sets forth two of the most effective means for curtailing anticompetitive behavior: injunctive relief and treble damages plus costs and attorney's fees.32
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), by means of the Antitrust Division, has exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of the
Sherman Act.33 The DOJ shares enforcement of the Clayton Act
with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).' In a similar vein to
the changing landscape of the enactment of federal legislation, the
Antitrust Division has changed its position on federal enforcement
through the years.
By the 1970s, the DOJ was warmed by the fire sparked from a
growing concern over industry in the U.S. that international
enforcement of domestic antitrust law could have a stippling effect
on foreign trade. 5 The 1977 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations ("1977 Guidelines") acted as a conductor
at an orchestra, setting the tone for the Antitrust Division's
3
enforcement regime6.
The 1977 Guidelines were meant to "provide a working statement of government enforcement policy"
while ensuring that U.S. antitrust laws should only be applied
extraterritorially where there is a substantial and foreseeable
effect on domestic commerce. 7 The 1977 Guidelines were written
with two main purposes in mind: "to protect the American consuming public by assuring it the benefit of competitive products
and ideas produced by foreign competitors as well as domestic
31. Clayton Act, Section 7, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18.
32. William J. Tuttle, The Return of Timberlane: The Fifth Circuit Signals a
Return to Restrictive Notions of ExtraterritorialAntitrust, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
319, 328 (2003).
33. Jeffrey N. Neuman, Through a Glass Darkly: The Case Against Pilkington plc.
Under the New U.S. Department of Justice InternationalEnforcement Policy, 16 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 284, 290 (1995) (citing Stephen J.Squeri, Government Investigation
and Enforcement: Antitrust Division, 847 PLI/CoRP. 11, 16 (June-July 1994)).
34. Id.
35. See generally Tuttle, supra note 32, at 338 (citing United States Dep't of Justice
Antitrust Guide for Int'l Operations,in 55 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
799 (Feb. 1, 1977)).
36. David A. Harris, United States v. Pilkingtonplc and PilkingtonHoldings, Inc.:
The Expansion of InternationalAntitrust Enforcement by the United States Justice
Department,20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 415, 421-22 n.63 (1995) (citing Antitrust
Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for Int'l Operations, [Jan.-June]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (Feb. 1, 1977)).
37. Tuttle, supra note 32, at 338.
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competitors and to protect American export and investment
opportunities from restriction imposed by a bigger or less principled competitor" abroad.3 s
Despite the broad language of the Sherman act, the legislative history and words of the statute are devoid of application of
the Act to foreign commerce, suggesting that legislators intended
the Act to apply exclusively to domestic trade.39 With the growth
of foreign trade at the end of the 20th century, the Congress
responded by passing the Foreign Trade and Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA). 0 The FTAIA covers trade or commerce with foreign nations where the trade or commerce has "a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on commerce in the United States.4 The intent was clearly to limit
enforcement of U.S. antitrust law abroad where there was no clear
effect on consumers in the United States.42 Much as with the
broad construction of the Sherman Act, the FTAIA itself was void
of description of what constitutes a "direct, substantial, and foreseeable" effect.43 The result has been a significant volume of cases
leaving more questions unanswered about the requirements to
38. Lori B. Morgan & Helaine S. Rosenbaum, Recent Development: U.S. Dep't of
Justice Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 192, 194 (1993).

39. Stephanie A. Casey, Balancing Deterrence, Comity Considerations, and
Judicial Efficiency: The Use of the D.C. Circuit's Proximate Cause Standard for
DeterminingSubject Matter Jurisdictionover ExtraterritorialAntitrust Cases, 55 AM.
U.L. REV. 585, 591 (2005); see also Note, supra note 18, at 2127 (concluding that
Congress intended the Sherman Act's reference to "foreign nations" to mean foreign
restraints on U.S. commerce only to the extent that such restraints affect commerce
in the United States.).
40. Pub. L. No. 97-290 § 402, 96 Stat. 1233, 1246 (1982) (codified at various
sections of 15 U.S.C. sections 6a, 45a (2009)).
41. Id.; see also F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 161
(2004) ("The FTAIA seeks to make clear to American exporters (and to firms doing
business abroad) that the Sherman Act does not prevent them from entering into
business arrangements (say, joint-selling arrangements), however anticompetitive, as
long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign markets. It does so by
removing from the Sherman Act's reach, (1) export activities and (2) other commercial
activities taking place abroad, unless those activities adversely affect domestic
commerce, imports to the United States, or exporting activities of one engaged in such
activities within the United States.") (internal citations omitted)).
42. Tuttle, supra note 32, at 345; see, e.g., Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v.
HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that FTAIA does not apply
where a Norwegian oil corporation that conducts business solely in the North Sea
brought a claim under U.S. antitrust law against several foreign and domestic
defendants that conspired to fix bids and allocate customers, territories, and projects
because the resulting inflated prices for heavy-lift barge services in the North Sea
involved injury that occurred abroad and resulted from effects in a non-domestic
market).
43. See id.
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bring a claim as relating to "a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on commerce in the United States."
Faced with a growing appetite for laissez faire economics,45
the Antitrust Division formally adopted the 1988 Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations ("1988
Guidelines").R The guidelines proposed a more "relaxed"
approach to enforcing U.S. antitrust law abroad.4" The overarching goal of the 1988 Guidelines was to "yield the best allocation of
resources, lowest prices, and the highest quality products and services for consumers."4 S The Guidelines appeared to restrict the
DOJ's focus to adverse effects on competition that would harm
U.S. consumers through a reduction in output or increase in
prices.49
The tenure of the 1988 guidelines was short-lived, as the
Antitrust Division issued a press release in 1992 that effectively
returned to the 1977 Guidelines.5" The change essentially rendered the DOJ to the heyday of applying enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign commercial conduct that adversely affects
44. See, e.g., Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding foreign price-fixing of antibiotics is not covered by United States
antitrust law where scheme has no demonstrable direct, substantial, reasonably
foreseeable, anticompetitive domestic effect); c.f. Inquivosa SA v. Ajinomoto Co. (In re
Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig.) 477 F.3d 535 (D. Minn. 2007) (for claims
relating to the "gives rise to" language of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1982, foreign corporate buyers are required to show that domestic effects of
anticompetitive conduct were direct or proximate under the plaintiffs Sherman Act
claim); United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under FTAIA in claim
brought by United States for foreign restraint of trade arising under contract's
restrictive clause that banned foreign company from selling long shelf-like tomato
seeds in North America where the direct effects on domestic commerce were
speculative).
45. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV.
936, 958 (1987) (Under the rising tide that lifted the boat of 1980s economic thought,
the Chicago School taught that "[iun antitrust, the most minimal law, given the
existence of the statutes, is law that proscribes only clear cartel agreements and
mergers that would create a monopoly in a market that included all perceptible
potential competition. Let us review the characteristics that underlie this minimalist
approach to antitrust.").
46. Tuttle, supra note 32, at 347.
47. Dean Brockbank, The 1955 InternationalAntitrust Guidelines: The Reach of
U.S. Antitrust Law Continues to Expand, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (1996).
48. Tuttle, supra note 32, at 347 (quoting United States Dep't of Justice 1988
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Int'l Operations,in 55 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988)).
49. Id.
50. Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at 192.
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U.S. exports where the conduct would have been prosecuted had it
occurred within the United States.5 ' The changes reflected a rising tide meant to protect U.S. exporters and extended the tight
reach of the 1988 Guidelines, whose focus was mainly related to
"adverse effects on competition that would harm U.S. consumers
by reducing output or raising prices." 2
To aid with international enforcement efforts, Congress
passed the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act in
1994 (IAEAA)." The IAEAA was designed to enhance obtaining
foreign-located antitrust evidence by authorizing the DOJ and
FTC to share antitrust evidence with foreign competition law
enforcement agencies on a reciprocal basis. 4 The IAEAA also
authorized the U.S. enforcement agencies to assist their foreign
counterparts with prosecutions abroad;" however, this coordination was only allowed where there was an agreement in place in
which the foreign government agreed to help the United States in
domestic prosecutions by gathering evidence in that foreign country. 6 There are currently cooperation agreements in place
between the United States and the following countries throughout
the Americas: Brazil, 7 Canada," and Mexico.' 9 The agreements
all proclaim: "the purpose of this Agreement is to promote cooperation, including both enforcement and technical cooperation,
between the competition authorities of the Parties, and to ensure
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-12 (2009).
54. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 103 P.L. 438
(1994).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 6202(a).
56. Id. at 6207.
57. United States of America, Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil regarding
Cooperation between their Competition Authorities in the Enforcement of their
Competition Laws, Oct. 26, 1999, available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
international/3776.htm.
58. United States of America, Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada Regardingthe Application of Their
Competition and Deceptive Marketing PracticesLaws, August 1995, available at http:/
/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/0316.htm; United States of America,
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada on the Application of Positive Comity Principles to the
Enforcement of their Competition Laws, October, 2004, availableat http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/public/international/docs/205732.htm.
59. United States of America, Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States regarding the
Application of their Competition Laws, July 7, 2000, available at httpJ/www.usdoj.
gov/atr/icpac/5145.htm.
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that the Parties give careful consideration to each other's important interests in the application of their competition laws." °
Despite the ambitious hopes for the IAEAA, foreign nations
have not been in thunderous applause. For example, both Japan
and the European Union expressed strong skepticism in helping
the United States prosecute foreign companies (the effect of which
may disadvantage companies operating in Japan and the EU), as
well as concerns that such foreign cooperation might render the
DOJ and FTC with unchecked power. 1 With the foreign outcry
against the IAEAA and attempts thereafter to harmonize international enforcement efforts, the DOJ and FTC began to herald an
international code of enforcement agency as a "utopian goal and a
62
matter for the distant future at best.
In 1995, the Clinton administration issued a revised version
of the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations ("1995 Guidelines"). With apparent backing from the federal courts, 64 the DOJ issued a comparatively more proenforcement position with regard to extraterritorial antitrust violations. 5 The guidelines included an emphasis on enforcing the
Sherman Act internationally. 6 The clearly-defined goals provided
that government agencies would enforce antitrust laws to the "fullest extent," enforcement would not discriminate on nationality
grounds or the nexus of the alleged violation, and the agencies
would endeavor to observe international comity6 7 to the greatest
60. See, e.g., id.
61. William P. Connolly, Lessons to be Learned: The Conflict in International
Antitrust Law Contrasted with Progress in InternationalFinancialLaw, 6 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 207, 228-30 (2001).
62. Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalizationof Antitrust Enforcement, 77
B.U. L. REV. 343, 380 (1997) (citing U.S. Trade Official Cannot Foresee Prospect of
InternationalAntitrust Code, 66

ANTITRUST

& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 548 (May 12,

1994)).
63. United States Dep't of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for Int'l Operations, reprinted in 68 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1707 (Special Supp.) (Apr. 6, 1995).
64. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
65. See, e.g., James S. McNeil, ExtraterritorialAntitrust Jurisdiction:Continuing
the Confusion in Policy, Law, and Jurisdiction,28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 425, 449-50
(1998).
66. See supra note 63, at 1.
67. Generally, U.S. courts have held that they will not abstain from enforcing U.S.
antitrust laws due to international comity. As a result of antitrust jurisprudence
discussed below, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. has left us to answer the resounding question
of how far the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws extend? See Salil K.
Mehra, Deterrence:The PrivateRemedy and InternationalAntitrust Cases, 40 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 275, 287 n.46 (2002).

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

464

[Vol. 40:3

extent possible.18
Many commentators have opined on the manner in which the
federal government's policy has shifted over the years toward a
stance that favors extraterritorial enforcement against foreign
business conduct that adversely harms both U.S. consumers and
exporters.6 9 As discussed in the following two sections reviewing
existing legal scholarship and federal court cases, there has been
substantial and an almost constant ebb ofjurisprudence related to
extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust law."°
III.

A SURVEY OF EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP

Many scholars have explored the manner in which the changing array of DOJ Guidelines, federal statutes, and the ensuing
interpretations by courts have affected competition law in the U.S.
and abroad.7 1 Most agree that "[a]side from a few recent efforts at
picking low-hanging fruit, attempts to harmonize national antitrust laws have failed, leaving convergence largely in the independent discretion of national authorities." 2 There is also general
consensus that private antitrust actions have two main goals: to
deter future conduct and to provide redress to injured parties.7 3
The question hinges on what level of U.S. law or international
agreement is required to shape an informed understanding of the
relationship between private remedies and deterrence with
respect to foreign conduct that affects domestic markets."
Most commentators have interpreted the mix of cases involving domestic enforcement of international antitrust action as taking either a narrow or broad view of the FTAIA.7 5 The former
proscribes an open interpretation of the FTAIA, namely that the
68. McNeil, supra note 65, at 450 (citing Diane P. Wood, The 1995 Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for InternationalOperations:An Introduction,Address Before
the American Bar Association Antitrust Section (Apr. 5, 1995), 1995 WL 150745
(D.O.J.)).
69. See Marino Lao, JurisdictionalReach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka
and Yokota, and "Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 871 (1994).
70. See McNeil, supra note 65, at 451 ("[Tlhe evolution of DOJ enforcement policy
from the 1977 Guidelines' effects on commerce, to the 1988 Guidelines' effects on
consumers, to the expansive 1995 Guidelines' Hartford Fire conflict limitation has
contributed to international mistrust of United States antitrust enforcement.").
71. See generally Note, supra note 18, at 2122.
72. Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM.AND MARY L.
REV. 627, 640 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
73. Mehra, supra note 67, at 280.
74. Id. at 322.
75. Salil K. Mehra, ForeignPlaintiffs in U.S. Courts: Ends and Means, 16 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 347, 351-55 (2004).
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"effect" on U.S. commerce does not need to form the basis for a
plaintiffs injury.7 6 The narrow view, on the other hand, mandates
that the plaintiffs
claim arise out of an injury related to domestic
77
commerce.

The following section sets forth the path by which U.S. antitrust laws have evolved through the modem century.
IV.

A.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS TEST

The Evolution of the "Effects" Standard

Over the past one hundred years, there has been a significant
shift in the federal government's treatment of domestic antitrust
claims arising from acts committed overseas.7 ' The Supreme
Court expressed its most recent stance on the extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws in 1993.79 In Hartford Fire Insurance, the Court held that the Sherman Act was appropriately
applied to extraterritorial conduct because the defendants
intended for their actions to have a substantial effect in the
76. See, e.g., Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 399-400 (2d Cir. 2002)
(Where a conspiracy to rig auctions for art, antiques, and collectibles had effects on
U.S. commerce, buyers and sellers injured by the foreign effects of that conspiracy
could maintain a Sherman Act claim.); Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd.,
315 F.3d 338, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (where the anticompetitive conduct satisfied the
requisite harm on domestic commerce under the FTAIA, a foreign plaintiff may bring
suit solely for alleged injury sustained by that conduct's effect on foreign commerce.
The anticompetitive conduct itself must have violated the Sherman Act and the
conduct's harmful effect on the United States' commerce must have given rise to a
claim by someone, even if not the foreign plaintiff who was before the court.).
77. See, e.g., Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420
(5th Cir. 2001) (holding that FTAIA does not apply where a Norwegian oil corporation
that conducts business solely in the North Sea brought a claim under U.S. antitrust
law against several foreign and domestic defendants that conspired to fix bids and
allocate customers, territories, and projects, because the resulting inflated prices for
heavy-lift barge services in the North Sea involved injury that occurred abroad and
resulted from effects in a non-domestic market).
78. Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust and the
Foundationsof Modern American Business Regulation from Knight to Swift, 39 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 85, 96 (2005) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court's early antitrust decisions were a
watershed in the history of American constitutional law that in many ways laid the
groundwork for the expansive role the federal government would later take in
regulating the social and economic life of the nation."); Carol B. Swanson, Antitrust
Excitement in the New Millennium: Microsoft, Mergers, and More, 54 OKLA. L. REV.
285, 286 ("Antitrust law, the protector of frogs and other competitors in the American
pond, has long been a storied feature of our culture. Since its inception in 1890, this
characteristically American institution has undergone a considerable evolution,
ebbing and flowing through banner years of exuberant enforcement and milder times
of reticent retreat." (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
79. See generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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United States, and such an effect resulted.80 Furthermore, the
Antitrust Division has prosecuted many foreign corporations and
individuals for engaging in foreign conduct that violates the Sherman and Clayton Acts;81 the Division has indicated that it is "committed to rooting out corruption that harms American consumers
and the competitive process, whether the criminal conduct takes
place here in the United States or overseas. '"82
It is unlikely that such international enforcement by the Justice Department would have been permitted by the federal courts
in the early twentieth century. In 1909, the Supreme Court
addressed whether an American plaintiff could recover damages
against an American defendant for harms suffered abroad as a
result of the defendant's conduct on foreign soil.84 The defendant
attempted to control the banana trade in a portion of Central
America by interfering with the plaintiffs banana plantation in
Panama and the connecting railway.85 To resolve the issue, the
Court first stated "the general and almost universal rule is that
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."86 The
Court further found it highly unlikely that Congress intended for
the Sherman Act to be applied to criminal acts committed in Panama or Costa Rica. 7 In this particular instance, the Court held
that the defendant's conduct in Central America clearly did not
fall within the scope of the Sherman Act, and ultimately affirmed
judgment for the defendant, dismissing the plaintiffs complaint. 8
80. See id. at 796.
81. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice Antitrust Division, Three Foreign
Executives Indicted for Their Roles in LCD Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Feb. 3, 2009),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2009/242162.htm
[hereinafter DOJ Antitrust Division, Three Foreign Executives Indicted].
82. Press Release, Dep't of Justice Antitrust Division, Japanese Executive Pleads
Guilty, Sentenced to Two Years in Jail for Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids
and Bribe Foreign Officials to Purchase Marine Hose and Related Products (Dec. 10,
2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2008/240307.htm
[hereinafter DOJ Antitrust Division, Japanese Executive Pleads Guilty].
83. This is caused in large part by a progression toward a global economy. Joel
Klein, former Assistant Attorney General of Antitrust opined, "[Tihe economy is
shifting. There's a paradigmatic shift from fundamental, domestic economies to global
economies, and no matter what people or politicians say, the truth of the matter is
that the economy will become increasingly globalized." Joel I. Klein, Antitrust
Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century, 32 CoNN. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (2000).
84. See generally American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
85. See id. at 354-55.
86. Id. at 356.
87. See id. at 357.
88. See id. at 357, 359; William S. Dodge, Extraterritorialityand Conflict-of-laws
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Fewer than forty years later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (designated as a court of last resort) 9 recognized an
exception to the rule from American Banana. In United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa"), the Second Circuit acknowledged that foreign conduct that produces consequences within the
borders of the United States may be within the federal government's reach. 90 Among myriad issues was whether Alcoa and Aluminum Limited had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy, based in
Europe, which restrained competition in the aluminum market in
various countries. 9 ' Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court,
established the "effects test" to determine whether the Sherman
Act governs anticompetitive conduct that takes place outside of
the United States. 92 Under Alcoa, for the Sherman Act to apply to
a defendant who participated in an anticompetitive extraterritorial agreement, the defendant must have (1) intended for the
agreement to have an effect on imports into the United States,
and; (2) the agreement must have had such an effect. 3
While some federal courts applied Alcoa's "effects test" to

determine the applicability of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct,94 others chose to modify the rule. 95 As a result, the precise
Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 102 (noting
that from a statutory interpretation vantage, the case purports that when a statute is
silent, it should be interpreted as applying only to conduct that falls within the
territory of the United States).
89. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir.
1945) (indicating that the Supreme Court gave the Second Circuit authority to act as
the court of last resort for this case).
90. See id. at 443-44.
91. See id. at 422, 441-43.
92. See id. at 443-44.
93. See id. at 444. There has been significant debate over the notion of an
intended and foreseeable effect. C.f Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward
Common Principlesof ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,98 HARv. L. REV. 1310, 1313 n. 15
(comparing Aluminum Co. of Am. (holding that effect must be "intended" and that it
must occur in fact), with ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDE FOR INT'L OPERATIONS 6 (1977), reprinted in APPENDIX TO PERSPECTIVES ON THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 173, 184 (J.
Griffin ed. 1979) (stressing that foreseeability of effect is the decisive factor)).
94. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (7th Cir.
1980) (applying the "effects test" as developed in Alcoa in an action against foreign
uranium producers).
95. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d
597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (adding the element of international comity to the "effects
test," thus creating a tripartite analysis); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (describing the many variations of
the effects test across jurisdictions).

468

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

standard became blurred.96 In 1982, however, Congress passed
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) to
address "conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign
nations." 97 The FTAIA makes clear that the Sherman Act does not
apply to foreign trade or commerce unless certain conditions are
met; specifically, the Act applies when:
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or
import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of
this Act, other than this section.98
Despite the passage of the FTAIA, the Supreme Court applied a
common law substantial effects rule to establish that the Sherman
Act applies to the extraterritorial conduct at issue in Hartford
Fire Insurance.99 The Court appeared reluctant to apply the
FTAIA because it was both "unclear how it might apply to the conduct alleged" and "unclear

.

. whether the Act's 'direct, substan-

tial, and reasonably foreseeable effect' standard amends existing
law or merely codifies it."100 Because the Court believed that the
facts at issue would have satisfied the FTAIA standard as well,
the Court chose not to explicitly address these uncertainties. 1°'
Thus, the Supreme Court applied a substantial effects test in
Hartford Fire Insurance, much like the "effects test" from Alcoa,
despite the existence of a statute that appeared to be on point.
This decision, of course, decreased the importance of the FTAIA.
According to the First Circuit, "[tihe FTAIA is inelegantly phrased
and the court in HartfordFire declined to place any weight on it.
We emulate this example and do not rest our ultimate conclusion
96. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 677-78 (9th Cir.
2004).
97. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
98. Id.
99. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). Although
the Court does not use the FTAIA to justify application of the Sherman Act to the
defendant's conduct, it does look to the FTAIA in its discussion of international
comity. See id. at 798.
100. Id. at 796 n.23.
101. See id.
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about Section One's scope upon the FTAIA."1 °2 The opinion from
the First Circuit is particularly important, as it extended the rule
from HartfordFire Insurance,which dealt with a civil issue, to the
criminal realm. 1 3
Many courts, however, began to consistently apply the FTAIA
to determine whether extraterritorial conduct could be reached by
the Sherman Act."0 4 In 2004, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
although some courts did not initially apply the FTAIA to Sherman Act cases, the statute is becoming much more widely used.' 5
Previously, there had been a great deal of debate over whether the
statute "established a new jurisdictional standard or merely codified the standard applied in Alcoa and its progeny." 0 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that, because the statutory language was different from the common law effects test, the FTAIA was in fact a new
jurisdictional standard.0 7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
applied the FTAIA to determine Sherman Act jurisdiction in
2004.'08

B.

The Elements of the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act

Currently, the FTAIA appears to be the relevant standard for
determining whether extraterritorial anticompetitive conduct
comes under jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.'0 9 The FTAIA
begins with the proposition that the Sherman Act does not "apply
to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade
or import commerce) with foreign nations."1 0 It then creates an
exception to this general rule, laying out the conditions that must
102. United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted).
103. See id. at 9.
104. See, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir.
2004) (stating that the court "must adhere to the FTAIA in determining whether a
district court has subject matter jurisdiction over an alleged foreign restraint of
trade"); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 100709 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (indicating the FTAIA as the relevant statute for determining
whether extraterritorial conduct falls under U.S. jurisdiction for a case involving
foreign plaintiffs and defendants); Boyd v. AWB Limited, 544 F. Supp. 2d 236, 242-43
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying FTAIA to determine whether U.S. farmers could bring suit
against an Australian wheat producer for monopolizing the sale of wheat to Iraq).
105. See LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 678.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158-59. (2004).
109. See id.
110. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
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be met for the courts to apply the Sherman Act to extraterritorial
conduct.1 1 ' This is known as the "domestic-injury exception" to the
FTAIA. 112 Many scholars have noted that this exception has been
instrumental in providing "self-help" to U.S. consumers injured by
foreign business conduct."'
Previously, under the common law standard used by the
Supreme Court in HartfordFire Insurance, Sherman Act jurisdiction was predicated on a showing that: (1) the defendant intended
for its conduct to have a substantial effect in the United States,
and (2) such an effect resulted." 4 To satisfy the domestic-injury
exception of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant's conduct produced a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect in the United States; and (2) that such effect gives rise to a
claim under the Sherman Act." 5 While the focus of this article
deals with judicial interpretation of "substantial effects," it is
appropriate to briefly discuss the other aspects of the standard."6
C. Direct Effect
In LSL Biotechnologies, the Ninth Circuit borrowed its reasoning from the Supreme Court to develop a definition for
"direct.""' 7 This case involved a joint venture contract between
LSL Biotechnologies, an American corporation, and Hazera, an
Israeli corporation. Together, the two companies sought to
develop tomatoes with a longer shelf life through genetic alteration." 8 The contract contained a Restrictive Clause that would
have prevented Hazera from selling such modified tomato seeds to
Mexico." 9' The government asserted that this agreement would:
(1) decrease the likelihood that Hazera would develop such tomato
111. See id.
112. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 159.
113. See D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The InstitutionalChallenge
of InternationalAntitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 37, 46 (2007).
114. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
116. It is also important to note that the notion of international comity is not
explicitly recognized in either standard. Once a greater consideration, the
significance of international comity has faded over time. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at
798 (resolving the international comity issue, declaring that the "only substantial
question in this litigation is whether 'there is in fact a true conflict between domestic
and foreign law'").
117. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004).
118. See id. at 674.
119. See id. at 677.
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seeds; and (2) allow LSL Biotechnologies to charge higher prices
120
for their tomato seeds.
Although the Supreme Court had not defined a "direct effect"
in the context of the FTAIA, it had done so for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which contained similar language. 121 Reinforcing that interpretation, the Ninth Circuit found that "an effect
is "direct" if it follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity." 22 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Restrictive Clause at issue in LSL Biotechnologies did not produce a
direct effect in the United States, finding that "any innovation
that Hazera would bring to American consumers is speculative at
best and doubtful at worst .... Hazera's delivery of long shelf-life
seeds to North American growers depends on Hazera first creating such seeds, a development that is certainly not guaranteed."1 23
Thus, given the uncertainty associated with the development of a
new product, the court found that the defendants' agreement did
not create an "immediate consequence" in the United States. The
Ninth Circuit did, however, leave the door open, as it acknowledged that there are circumstances where excluding a "potential
foreign competitor" may impose a direct effect in the United
States.124
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized that while
the FTAIA requires that the defendant's conduct produce a "direct
effect," the Alcoa standard lacked a "direct effect" element.'25 This
clearly marks a departure from the common law standard, which
requires only a substantial effect to be produced in the United
States, and stresses the importance of direct effects analysis. In
the progeny following LSL Biotechnologies,various federal district
courts have adopted the direct effects analysis as presented by the
126
Ninth Circuit.
D.

Reasonably ForeseeableEffect

Courts have been less explicit regarding the interpretation of
"reasonably foreseeable" in the context of the FTAIA. Because the
120. See id. at 680-81.
121. See id. at 680.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 681.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 679.
126. See, e.g., In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig. v. Intel Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 2d 555, 560 (D. Del. 2006); CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 526, 545
(D.N.J. 2005); Boyd v. AWB Limited, 544 F. Supp. 2d 236, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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common law standard accounted for an element of intent, the
"reasonably foreseeable" element has been viewed as connected to
the former intent requirement. 127 It has also been argued that in
drafting the FTAIA, Congress wanted "to make explicit the
requirement that the effect be 'reasonably foreseeable' rather than
based on 'intent.""2 As a practical matter, it appears that foreign
conduct that produces a substantial effect in the United States is
likely to satisfy the reasonable foreseeability requirement as
1
well. 29
E.

Gives Rise to a Claim under the Sherman Act

Once it has been established that the defendant's foreign conduct produced a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect in the United States, the plaintiff must show that this effect
gave rise to a claim under the Sherman Act.

30

The Supreme

Court recently addressed this issue in the 2004 Empagran decision. In Empagran, foreign and domestic vitamin purchasers
claimed that they were harmed by a global price-fixing conspiracy
created by foreign and domestic vitamin manufacturers.' The
Court found that although the price-fixing conduct produced the
requisite effects, the effects experienced by consumers in the
United States were independent from the effects experienced by
the plaintiffs abroad. 13 2 The Court held that the FTAIA exception
for jurisdiction "does not apply where the plaintiffs claim rests
solely on the independent foreign harm." 33 As a result, the FTAIA
exception did not apply because the effects in the United States
did not give rise to the Sherman Act claim asserted by the foreign
plaintiffs.
In the future, plaintiffs may argue that antitrust injury
experienced abroad was connected to the domestic effects pro127. See McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 120 n.9 (1st Cir. 2005).
128. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 690 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (noting also that
foreseeability was not included in the initial draft of the FTAIA and was probably a
point of debate in Congress). See id. at 691.
129. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993). The
Court found that the conduct at issue produced a substantial effect in the United
States and was subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction under the common law. Without
engaging in any explicit analysis, the Court also concluded that the conduct at issue
would satisfy the direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable requirement of the
FTAIA. See id.
130. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
131. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004).
132. See id. at 163-64.
133. Id. at 159.
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duced by the foreign conduct.'
In Empagran, the Court did not
address this argument, as it was not addressed by the lower
courts. 135 It is unclear whether the FTAIA exception would be
applicable to a situation where foreign conduct produced a direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect in the United States,
and such effect in turn created foreign harm.
On remand, the District of Columbia Circuit found that the
domestic injury exception requires a direct or proximate causal
relationship between the domestic effect and the foreign injury,
not merely a "but for" relationship. 36 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have also adopted the proximate cause test for applying the
second prong of the domestic-injury exception of the FTAIA.'3 7
Thus, a plaintiff would need to establish a direct causal relationship between the direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
domestic effect and the antitrust injury.
F.

JudicialApplication of the Substantial Effects
Standard

The domestic-injury exception of the FTAIA creates a twoprong test for determining when the Sherman Act may be applied
to conduct involving commerce with foreign nations." 8 Whereas
many elements of this standard were not explicitly applied before
the enactment of the FTAIA, substantiality of effect has long been
a consideration by the courts. 9 The following examples demonstrate judicial application of the substantial effects standard both
at common law and as part of the domestic-injury exception of the
FTAIA.
The first two cases, Hartford Fire Insurance and Nippon
Paper, demonstrate the ability of United States law to reach foreign defendants for engaging in extraterritorial conduct having
"substantial effects" in the United States. The cases following
those involve more detailed analyses of what constitutes "substantial effects."
134. See CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 526, 552 n.17 (D.N.J. 2005).
135. See id.
136. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-Laroche, 417 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
137. See Inquivosa SA v. Ajinomoto Co. (In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust
Litig.), 477 F.3d 535, 538-39 (8th Cir. 2007); Centerprise Int'l Inc. v. Micron
Technology, Inc. (In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig.), 546 F.3d
981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).
138. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
139. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 509 U.S. at 796.
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Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California

In this case, a group of plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
"conspired in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act to restrict the
terms of coverage of commercial general liability (CGL) insurance
available in the United States."1 0 Among the defendants was a
group of London-based reinsurers who had allegedly conspired to
limit the availability of CGL insurance in the United States, particularly in the State of California.14 ' The district court dismissed
the claims against the London-based defendants, citing reasons of
4
The Court of Appeals reversed this disinternational comity1'
missal, finding that "the principle of international comity was no
bar to exercising Sherman Act jurisdiction."1 4 The Supreme
Court found that Sherman Act was appropriately applied to the
London defendants, indicating that extraterritorial conduct that is
both intended to create a substantial effect in the United States
and does create such an effect is within the scope of the Sherman
Act. 144
The Court concluded that conspiring to influence the United
States insurance market as the London reinsurers were alleged to
have done met the substantial effects standard.14 Because such
effect was intended and experienced in the United States, the
location of the conduct was not a relevant factor. Although American Banana suggests that conduct taking place overseas is not
within reach of the United States, multiple opinions since that
time have clarified this rule; extraterritorial conduct that harms
the United States may be within jurisdiction.1 46
The British defendants argued that the charges against them
47
should have been dismissed because of international comity.1
The Court found that international comity would lead to dismissal
only in cases where the domestic and foreign rule came into conflict.1 48 Because it was possible for the defendants to simultanecomity
ously adhere to American and English law, international
49
here.
jurisdiction
Act
Sherman
to
bar
a
present
did not
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 770.
See id. at 795.
See id. at 778.
Id. at 779.
See id. at 796.
See id.
See discussion supra Part W.A.
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 797.
See id. at 798.
See id. at 799.
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United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co.

Several years later, the First Circuit addressed a similar
issue in the criminal context. In Nippon Paper,the United States
charged a Japanese corporation with engaging in price-fixing of
thermal fax paper distributed to North America. 150 Because the
entirety of the anticompetitive conduct took place in Japan, the
First Circuit needed to address whether the United States could
convict a foreign corporation for violating the Sherman Act, given
that the acts at issue took place in a foreign country.' 5 '
To resolve this question, the First Circuit looked to Hartford
Fire Insurance rather than the FTAIA."' The court found that
because "civil antitrust actions predicated on wholly foreign conduct which has an intended and substantial effect in the United
States come within Section One's jurisdictional reach, 153 and the
statutory language for civil and criminal matters are identical, the
court also had jurisdiction over this prosecution (provided that the
conduct had an intended and substantial effect in the United
States)." Whether the defendant's conduct had a substantial
effect was not at issue because the First Circuit's decision simply
reversed the lower court's dismissal.'
iii.

United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co.

In a suit filed in the Northern District of Illinois, chemical
manufacturers from India and the United States alleged that
other chemical corporations "attempted to monopolize, monopolized and conspired to monopolize the market for certain chemicals in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act." '56 More
specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants interfered
5 7
with their intentions to manufacture certain chemicals.
Because the alleged conduct involved international commerce, the
court applied the FTAIA to determine
whether the Sherman Act
58
could apply to the defendants.

150. United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1997).
151. See id. at 4-5.
152. See discussion supra Part IV.F.
153. United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
154. See id. at 10-11.
155. See id. at 2. The lower court held that "a criminal antitrust prosecution could
not be based on wholly extraterritorial conduct" and dismissed the indictment. Id.
156. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1006
(N.D. Ill. 2001).
157. See id. at 1007.
158. See id. at 1007-09.
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Ultimately, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate the requisite level of domestic effect necessary for the
domestic-injury exception of the FTAIA to apply for a variety of
reasons.'59 First, the court found that plaintiffs did not intend to
sell one of the chemicals at issue in the United States; had it
attempted this, plaintiffs would not even have found buyers. 6 °
Moreover, had the plaintiffs made sales to the United States,
these sales would have been made in "tiny volumes"-"such sales
would not amount to any kind of "substantial effect" on domestic
16
commerce." 1
iv.

Dee-K Enters. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd.

This case came before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Two domestic companies brought suit against Southeast
Asian rubber thread producers for fixing prices. 6 ' The district
court applied the common law substantial effect test to determine
jurisdiction. Although the district court found that the defendants
had in fact engaged in price-fixing that was intended to have a
substantial effect in the United States market, the court held
(based on a jury finding) that the defendants' behavior did not pro16 3
duce such an effect and ruled in the defendants' favor.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's use
of the common law substantial effect test as well as the result;
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the defendants' foreign
6
conduct produced a substantial effect in the domestic market. 1
According to the plaintiffs' appellate brief, the defendants "had
over $50 million in U.S. sales, raised their U.S. prices over 40%,
and controlled more than half of the U.S. market.' 6 5 The court
held, however, that the price-fixing conduct did not meet the substantial effects standard even though the plaintiffs claimed to
have "purchased substantial quantities of extruded rubber thread
from defendants."166
159. See id. at 1009.
160. See id. at 1012-13.
161. Id. at 1012. According to the plaintiffs catalogues, the chemical at issue was
offered in 1-gram to 500-gram quantities. The prices ranged from $142 to $ 18,600
per kilogram. The court concluded that these quantities were not sufficient and could
not rise to the level of requisite effects. Id.
162. See Dee-K Enters. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 299 F.3d 281, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
163. See id.
164. See id. at 283, 296.
165. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 1, Dee-K Enters. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 299
F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002)(01-1894).
166. See Dee-K Enters., 299 F.3d at 284. The plaintiffs did not appear to submit
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Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am.

In this matter argued to the Seventh Circuit, American and
English copper short-sellers brought suit against several corporations for cornering the copper market on the London Metals
Exchange (LME).167 The District Court held for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA. 6 s The Seventh Circuit,
reversed, finding that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs was
sufficient to satisfy the domestic-injury exception of the FTAIA.'69
The Court based its decision on several significant factors: the
plaintiffs engaged in copper trading in New York, the trading at
issue was regulated by the Commodities Future Trading Commission, New York traders had to contact London Metals Exchange
traders in order to complete the trades, and physical copper was
delivered to domestic LME warehouses. 170 The court concluded
that "[t]hese ties are enough to satisfy the standards imposed by
1 71
the FTAIA."
vi.

In re Dynamic Random Access Memory

In this case, the Northern District of California granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA. 72 The plaintiff, a British corporation, alleged that the defendants, electronic
corporations "engaged in a global conspiracy to fix prices for
DRAM, an electronic microchip."17 3 According to the plaintiff, the
defendants raised prices for DRAM in the United States, which
led to an increase in worldwide prices that harmed the plaintiff.74
The court stated that the defendant's conduct produces a substantial effect in the United States under the FTAIA "if it involves a
sufficient volume of US commerce and is not a mere 'spillover
effect." 7 Because of the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy and
the "large volume" of commerce in the United States, the court
numerical data to back up this claim; they demonstrated a rise in the prices, but the
defendants argued that prices rose due to other factors. See id. at 285.
167. Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 325 F.3d 836, 836-37 (7th
Cir. 2003).
168. See id. at 837.
169. See id. at 841-42.
170. See id. at 842.
171. Id.
172. See In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 515629
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2.
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found that the foreign conduct at issue176satisfied the first prong of
the FTAIA domestic-injury exception.
vii.

Sun Microsystems Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc.

This case also involves the DRAM conspiracy; the plaintiff
computer companies asserted that the defendant's price-fixing
conduct caused them to pay higher prices for DRAM. 177 Given the
foreign conduct at issue, the Northern District of California
applied the FTAIA to determine whether the conduct fell under
the domestic-injury exception.17 The court held that "a domestic
effect is established here by virtue of plaintiffs' allegations that
defendants' conduct led to higher prices for DRAM in the United
States, which in turn formed the predicate for plaintiffs' domestic
agreements to pay higher prices for DRAM." 79 Thus, the substantial effect standard was met because prices increased in the
United States as a result of the price-fixing conspiracy.
viii.

Boyd v. AWB Limited

Turning to the east coast, the Southern District of New York
recently addressed the substantial effects issue. In Boyd, wheat
farmers from the United States brought suit against an Australian corporation who allegedly acquired and maintained a monopoly on selling wheat to Iraq."' ° For the court to have jurisdiction
over this issue, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate that the defendant's wheat sales to Iraq produced a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" in the United States. 1 '
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's conduct prevented
the United States from participating in the Iraqi wheat market,
resulting in low projected Ending Stocks for American wheat,
which is closely associated with domestic wheat prices.'8 2 The
court, however, recognized that because numerous factors affect
176. See id. at 3. The district court did not explicitly address the numbers but cited
to the plaintiffs complaint with regard to the "large volume" of commerce. Plaintiffs
complaint indicates that DRAM sales that were directly affected by the conspiracy for
two of the defendants totaled over two billion U.S. dollars. See Complaint at 17, In re
Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 515629 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
1, 2006).
177. See Sun Microsystems Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1101,
1104 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
178. See id. at 1109-10.
179. Id. at 1113.
180. See Boyd v. AWB Ltd., 544 F. Supp. 2d 236, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
181. See id. at 243.
182. Id. at 244.
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Ending Stocks, the foreclosure of the Iraqi wheat market "simply
could not have been a substantial factor among the total mix of
global inputs that determine Ending Stocks, and hence wheat
prices, in the United States.""3 Therefore, contrary to plaintiffs
argument, activity within a geographic submarket does not necessarily have a direct or substantial impact on the global market.
G.

ExtraterritorialEnforcement by the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division

Scott Hammond, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
Criminal Enforcement at the Division, recently indicated that
"[t]he Antitrust Division will vigorously pursue individuals who
engage in antitrust crimes targeting U.S. businesses and consumers no matter where those individuals live or commit the crime
.... Today's charges should make clear that there are no safe
havens for international cartels that violate the U.S. antitrust
laws." 184 Over the past year, the Antitrust Division has brought
charges against a number of foreign defendants for engaging in
price fixing and bid rigging conspiracies that affect the United
States. More specifically, the Division has recently prosecuted
individuals and corporations involved in price fixing of liquid crystal display panels, price fixing in the air cargo industry, and bid
rigging of marine hose sales.
i. Liquid Crystal Display Panels
Last November, the Department charged Chunghwa Pictures
Tubes, Ltd., LG Display Co. Ltd., and Sharp Corporation with fixing prices of liquid crystal display (LCD) panels in violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act. 85 The Department alleged that these three
companies held meetings in various locations, including the
United States, to determine LCD panel prices, and subsequently
"issu[ed] price quotations in accordance with the agreements
reached." ' Furthermore, Sharp was charged with additional conspiracies regarding the sale of LCD panels to Dell, Apple and
Motorola. The Department reported that Sharp's revenues from
183. Id. at 245.
184. DOJ Antitrust Division, Three Foreign Executives Indicted, supra note 81.
185. Press Release, Dep't of Justice Antitrust Division, LG, Sharp, Chunghwa
Agree to Plead Guilty, Pay Total of $585 Million in Fines for Participating in LCD
Price-Fixing Conspiracies (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/pressjreleases2008/239349.htm.
186. Id.
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LCD sales for the 2007-2008 fiscal year totaled $6.8 billion. 18 7 The
informations filed by the government assert that the activities of
the three companies "were within the flow of, and substantially
affected, interstate and foreign trade and commerce."'88 Additionally, four foreign executives have agreed to plead guilty for their
part in this conspiracy, and three foreign executives were indicted;
these executives face criminal fines and jail time in the United
States."19
ii.

Air Cargo

The Department has also been investigating a conspiracy to
fix prices on air cargo transportation services. 9 ° The defendant
corporations are based in many countries, including Chile, Brazil,
Japan, Israel, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and the
Netherlands. 9 ' As of last January, "a total of 12 airlines and
three executives have pleaded guilty or agreed to plead guilty in
the Justice Department's ongoing investigation into price fixing in
the air transportation industry."19 2 The affected routes included
those to and from the United States and many of the conspirators'
meetings took place within the United States. 9 ' In addition to
meeting to discuss setting cargo rates and setting rates in accordance with those discussed at the meetings, these airlines also
engaged in monitoring and enforcement of these agreed-upon
rates.94
In the informations filed by the DOJ, the Antitrust Division
asserted that the conspirators "transported substantial quantities
187. Id.
188. Information, United States v. Chunghwa Pictures Tubes, Ltd. at para. 10,
Case No. CR 08-0804 WHA (N.D. Cal. 2008), available at http://www.usdoj/atr/cases/
f239300/239376.htm; Information, United States v. LG Display Co. Ltd. at para.ll,
Case No. CR 08-0803 VRW (N.D. Cal. 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f239300/239375.htm; Information, United States v. Sharp Co. at para.10, Case
No. CR 08-0802 PJH (N.D. Cal. 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f239300/239374.htm.
189. See DOJ Antitrust Division, Three Foreign Executives Indicted, supra note 81;
Press Release, Dep't of Justice Antitrust Division, Four Executives Agree to Plead
Guilty in Global LCD Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http:ll
www.usdoj .gov/atr/public/press -releases/2009/241541.htm.
190. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice Antitrust Division, Lan Cargo S.A.,
Aerolinhas Brasileiras S.A. and El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. Agree to Plead Guilty for
Fixing Prices on Air Cargo Shipments (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/public/press releases2009/241710.htm.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
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of cargo, in a continuous and uninterrupted flow of interstate and
foreign commerce, between various foreign countries and the
United States, including through various U.S. airports to final
destinations in various States" and that these activities substantially affected "interstate and foreign trade and commerce."195
iii.

Marine Hose

The Department's marine hose bid-rigging investigation has
also resulted in a number of foreign convictions. The alleged conspirators manufacture marine hose, which is "a flexible rubber
hose used to transfer oil between tankers and storage facilities."1 96
Marine hose manufacturers from Japan, the United Kingdom and
Italy were charged for engaging in a variety of anticompetitive
activities, including dividing market shares among themselves,
creating and enforcing marine hose price lists, and agreeing not to
compete for bids. 197 Furthermore, during the conspiracy period,
the defendants sold marine hose directly to American customers
and accepted payment for these products in the United States. 98
The following section presents an analysis of the change in
jurisprudence concerning extraterritorial enforcement of U.S.
antitrust law.
V.

FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS
TEST IN THE AMERICAS AND BEYOND

There remains little doubt that we live in a global economy. 99
The current economic crisis has made this all too clear. Cases like
Empagran,involving domestic and foreign plaintiffs and domestic
and foreign defendants, likewise make this clear. 00° As described
in the preceding sections of the article, it is apparent that the
United States (in fact, all three branches of the U.S. government)
195. See Information, United States v. Lan Cargo S.A. at para. 10, 11, Criminal
No.: 1:09-cr-00015-JDB (D.C. 2009) , available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f241700/241783.htm.
196. DOJ Antitrust Division, Japanese Executive Pleads Guilty, supra note 82, at

1.
197. See id. at 1, 2.
198. See id. at 2.

199. Diamond, supra note 10, at 809 ('With rampant globalization, instantaneous
communication, and multinationals building products with components from all over
the world and selling them far from where they are produced, it may be argued that
there no longer are independent, national markets.").
200. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. 542 U.S. at 159 (plaintiffs in Empagran were
foreign and domestic vitamin purchasers who claimed they were harmed by a global
price-fixing conspiracy created by foreign and domestic vitamin manufacturers).
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has taken affirmative steps to assert U.S. antitrust laws on individuals and entities beyond U.S. shores in the name of protecting
U.S. businesses and consumers from anticompetitive harm that is
hatched and/or carried out abroad. Because of the ever growing
and changing economic ties between the U.S. and its next-door
neighbors in the Americas, businesses and business executives
throughout the Americas should pay particular attention not to
run afoul of U.S. antitrust laws.
A.

Analysis of History and Trends

As noted above, the willingness of the United States Congress, U.S. courts, and enforcement agencies to attack anticompetitive conduct occurring abroad has come full-circle since the turn
of the previous century. In 1909, the United States Supreme
Court was unwilling to apply the Sherman Act to acts committed
in Central America, finding that "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must
be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done."" 1 A hundred years later, all branches of the U.S. government are quite willing to apply the antitrust laws (among others)
of the United States to determine the legality of acts committed in
other countries, including acts committed in the Americas." 2
While there is little doubt that the United States is certainly
amenable to address anticompetitive harm stemming from actions
abroad, the difficulty lies in ascertaining where exactly the line is
drawn and likely to be drawn in the future. As explained in this
article, the central consideration in drawing this line has been the
"substantial effects test." Utilizing this test, United States courts
have both chosen to accept jurisdiction of cases concerning
anticompetitive conduct abroad 20 3 and have also declined jurisdiction of such cases.0 4
This section analyzes whether any trends can be discerned
201. See generally American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356
(1909).
202. See cases collected supra Part IV.F.
203. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 n.23 (1993); Dee-K
Enters. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 299 F.3d 281, 283 (4th Cir. 2002); Metallgesellschaft
AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 325 F.3d 836, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Dynamic
Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 515629 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006);
Sun Microsystems Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1104 (N.D.
Cal. 2007).
204. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003,
1006 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Boyd v. AWB Ltd., 544 F. Supp. 2d 236, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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from the relevant cases. Specifically, are there factors that courts
consider in applying the "substantial effects test" that make it
more or less likely for a court to entertain jurisdiction over a particular case? Or, is the "substantial effects test" more often than
not manipulated by the court to justify a desired result?
B.

How Do Courts Apply the Substantial Effects Test?

As discussed above, the common law substantial effects test" 5
came to be replaced by FTAIA's "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" standard. °6 It is unclear, however, as a practical
matter that this distinction is significant, or even at all different.
i.

Direct and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect versus
Substantial Effect

The FTAIA's requirement that the relevant effect be "direct,"
for example, appears to do little to alter or add to the predecessor
common law analysis. At first blush the Ninth Circuit's description of the "direct effects" standard in LSL Biotechnologies
27
appears to go beyond the common law substantial effects test. 1
The Ninth Circuit addressed "direct effects" separately and noted
that "an effect is 'direct' if it follows as an immediate consequence
2 8 Specifically,
of the defendant's activity.""
the LSL Biotechnologies court held that the alleged anticompetitive conduct did not
result in a direct effect in the United States because the product
(genetically altered tomatoes with longer shelf lives) had not yet
been developed and, accordingly, the covenant which would have
restricted one of the contracting parties from selling the product
in Mexico at some point in the future did not result in a direct
effect to American consumers as the agreement between the
defendants created no "immediate consequence" in the United
States.
The LSL Biotechnologies court, however, could have substituted the words "substantial effects" in place of "direct effects" and
have come to exactly the same conclusion. In fact, it is difficult to
imagine a substantial anticompetitive effect on United States con205. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir.
1945); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1980)
(applying the "effects test" as developed in Alcoa in an action against foreign uranium
producers); Hartford, 509 U.S. at 796.
206. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
207. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004).
208. Id.
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sumers that would be classified by a court as anything other than
direct. Further, though it is quite easy to envision the flip-side to
that scenario-a direct effect that is not substantial-there would
be no practical effect to drawing such a distinction as the predecessor common law test focused only on whether a given effect was
"substantial" and therefore determining whether an effect is
direct or indirect would merely be a superfluous and inconsequential inquiry in relation to the predecessor common law test.
Accordingly, it appears that the FTAIA's "direct effects" standard
is largely superfluous in light of the predecessor common-law
analysis. 0 9
Similarly, the "reasonably foreseeable effect" required by the
FTAIA appears also to be merely superfluous in relation to the
substantial effects requirement. Here too, it is hard to imagine an
effect which is substantial on U.S. consumers, for instance, but is
not reasonably foreseeable. Whether one views the inclusion of
the "reasonably foreseeable effect" in the FTAIA as born from a
desire to codify the common law intent requirement or not, as a
practical matter, the requirement appears to be superfluous (as
seems to have been the case with the intent requirement at common law). 210
Accordingly, despite the courts' initial reluctance to adopt the
FTAIA in place of the common law test announced in Alcoa, it
appears to have been much ado about nothing in the end, as the
primary inquiry remains whether anticompetitive acts abroad
have a substantial effect on the United States. That said, it is
difficult to discern where a particular court may choose to draw
the "substantial effects" line in any given case.
ii.

Drawing the Substantial Effects Line

To begin to determine how a given court regards the substantial effects principle, one must understand whether courts applying the substantial effects test are adhering to some idolized
notion of a well-entrenched formulaic test or whether courts are
209. See The Rehnquist Court's Canons of Statutory Construction, http://www.csg.
org/meetings/interbranchlRehnquist CourtsCanons.pdf (last accessed Mar. 3,2009)
("Avoid interpreting a provision in a way that would render other provisions of the Act
superfluous or unnecessary.") (emphasis in original).
210. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 797 n.23. The Court found that the conduct at issue
produced a substantial effect in the United States and was subject to Sherman Act
jurisdiction under the common law. Without engaging in any explicit analysis, the
Court also concluded that the conduct at issue would satisfy the direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable requirement of the FTAIA. See id.
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simply manipulating what they perceive to be a fairly amorphous
test to lead to a desired result (or, as is more often than not the
case, something in the middle). The cases described in Section IV
of this article may provide some insight.
As an initial matter, however, it is important to note that the
phrase "substantial effects" has myriad definitions without reference to any of the cases. This is worth noting because most often
(as is very much the case here) tests are born from a particular
case, involving particular facts and those tests are then applied in
numerous other contexts, involving vastly different facts and even
distinct legal frameworks (as is the case with the substantial
effects test which, for example, is used for Sherman Act § 1 and
§ 2 cases). Accordingly, knowing that courts have and will continue to apply the "substantial effects" test in cases which are distinct from the seminal cases, and perhaps distinct from all
previous cases, it is advisable to take a step back and think about
the different ways the phrase "substantial effects" can be
interpreted.
At a macro level, the phrase "substantial effects" can be taken
to mean either that (1) the effects are "important" or "significant"
in a subjective or visceral manner; or that (2) the effects are sizeable or quantifiably large using some metric or seemingly objective
standard. For example, a court may decide that an antitrust conspiracy in China that directly and undoubtedly affects a handful
of U.S. consumers has a substantial effect in the U.S., even
though, by almost any metric, the effect might be negligible at
best with respect to the United States as a whole. Another court
might look at the same facts and determine that the plaintiffs
have come nowhere close to demonstrating substantial effects in
the United States.
These are, perhaps, extreme examples, but they help to illustrate that similar facts are capable of being interpreted quite differently under the "same" test. And if, as is most likely the case in
most cases, courts fall somewhere in the middle between completely subjective and rigidly adhering to a particular metric, it
could make a substantial difference which side of that line courts
tend to follow. If courts applying the "substantial effects" lean
toward the subjective end of the spectrum, we can assume that
courts would be more capable of construing the facts in a manner
that leads to desired results. Even if we are not inclined to adopt
so cynical a view, we would expect for results to be less predictable
(at least with reference only to the test and excluding other poten-
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tial biases). On the other hand, if courts were to lean more in the
opposite direction by adhering to some recognized metric, we
would expect much more predictability (which one might expect to
more frequently lead to viscerally unappealing results). A review
of relevant cases underscores the fact that courts do not appear to
adhere to any particular metric, but instead look at a number of
different factors when applying the "substantial effects" test. And
even where courts base their decisions on quantitative factors, the
metrics used lack uniformity and are susceptible to being manipulated to reach a desired outcome.
C. Cases Where The Substantial Effects Test Was
Held Not Satisfied
In United Phosphorus, for example, the court found that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the requisite effect for several reasons, including that the plaintiffs never intended to sell one of the
products at issue in the United States, and even had plaintiff
attempted to do so, the sales to the United States would have been
made in "tiny volumes"-"such sales would not amount to any
kind of "substantial effect" on domestic commerce. Although the
court that the "substantial effects" issue in quantitative termsi.e., "tiny volumes"-it appears not to have gone into great
detail.211
In Boyd, the Southern District of New York, in the § 1 context, rejected plaintiffs contention that the substantial effects
requirements had been met with respect to a defendant foreign
competitor who plaintiff alleged illegally maintained its monopoly
in a foreign wheat market (the Iraqi wheat market).212 Plaintiff
argued that its inability to participate in the Iraqi wheat market
resulted in a lower closing ticker price for Ending Stocks of American wheat commodities and assets (which plaintiff argued was
closely associated with domestic wheat prices).213 The court held,
however, that because numerous factors affect Ending Stocks, the
foreclosure of the Iraqi wheat market "simply could not have been
a substantial factor among the total mix of global inputs that
determine Ending Stocks, and hence wheat prices, in the United
2 4 It appears the Boyd Court was never faced with deterStates."
211. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012
2001).
(N.D. Ill.
212. See Boyd v. AWB Ltd., 544 F. Supp. 2d 236, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
213. Id. at 244.
214. Id. at 245.
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mining whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct had a substantial effect on U.S. commerce; rather, the question answered by
the Boyd Court was whether the foreclosure of the Iraqi wheat
market had a substantial effect on Ending Stocks. The court
appears to have satisfied itself, however, that any impact on
domestic wheat prices would be negligible and therefore would not
represent a substantial effect on U.S. commerce. In this way, the
Boyd court considered a quantitative impact on U.S. commerce
though it did not determine the precise effect based on the facts
before it.
Accordingly, both Boyd and United Phosphorus seem to indicate that courts have found the "substantial effects" test to not be
satisfied based on a pseudo-quantitative analysis focused on the
effect to U.S. commerce. It is unclear whether these courts failed
to quantify the effect more precisely merely because the majorities
held it was unnecessary in light of the specific facts presented or,
rather, because courts applying this test feel compelled to justify
their decisions by pointing to a pseudo-quantitative analysis,
though they do not actually base their decisions on such mathematical factors.
D.

Cases Where The Substantial Effects Test Was
Held To Be Satisfied

In Sumitomo the Seventh Circuit held that the evidence
presented by plaintiffs was sufficient to satisfy the "substantial
effects" test.215 Among the factors it cited as most significant were:
the plaintiffs engaged in copper trading in New York, the trading
at issue was regulated by the Commodities Future Trading Commission, New York traders had to contact London Metals
Exchange traders in order to complete the trades, and physical
copper was delivered to domestic LME warehouses." 6 The court
concluded that "[t]hese ties are enough to satisfy the standards
imposed by the FTAIA. ''217 Unlike the court in United Phosphorus,
the Seventh Circuit in Sumitomo did not focus on quantitative factors, but rather focused on the nexus between the defendants,
their alleged bad acts and the U.S. market. In fact, the Sumitomo
Court concluded that the "ties" were sufficient to satisfy the stan215. Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 325 F.3d 836, 836-37 (7th
Cir. 2003).
216. See id. at 842.
217. Id.
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dards imposed by the FTAIA.21 s
On the other hand, the district court in In re Dynamic Random Access Memory focused its substantial effects analysis on the
volume of commerce involved. 19 The court noted that conduct produces a substantial effect in the United States under the FTAIA
"if it involves a sufficient volume of US commerce and is not a
mere 'spillover effect.' ' 220 The court held that the "substantial
effects" test had been satisfied due to the "large volume" of commerce in the United States implicated by the price-fixing conspir-

acy.

221

In Sun Microsystems (also involving the DRAM conspiracy),
the court found that the substantial effects test was satisfied, noting that "a domestic effect is established here by virtue of plaintiffs' allegations that defendants' conduct led to higher prices for
DRAM in the United States, which in turn formed the predicate
for plaintiffs' domestic agreements to pay higher prices for
DRAM. 222 Although the Sun Microsystems Court did not particularly emphasize the volume of commerce involved, it is possible
the Court took that to be self-evident given the nature of the
litigation.2 23
While the Sumitomo Court appears not to have focused on the
specific quantitative effects of defendants alleged anticompetitive
acts, the DRAM courts do appear to have addressed the issue in
quantitative terms, albeit in general quantitative terms, i.e.,
"large volume."
It appears that a substantial number of courts, regardless of
whether they find the "substantial effects" test to have been met,
rely on general quantitative factors to support their decisions.
The trend appears to be one of courts focusing on "substantial
effects" on U.S. commerce as a whole (or, at least, large segments
218. Id.
219. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 515629 at 2.
220. Id. at 2.
221. See id. at 3. The district court did not explicitly address the numbers but cited
to the plaintiffs complaint with regard to the "large volume" of commerce. Plaintiffs
complaint indicates that DRAM sales that were directly affected by the conspiracy for
two of the defendants totaled over two billion U.S. dollars. See Complaint at 17, In re
Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 515629 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
1, 2006).
222. Sun Microsystems Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1101,
1113 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
223. As stated in In re Dynamic Random Access Memory, the Plaintiffs complaint
indicates that DRAM sales that were directly affected by the conspiracy for two of the
defendants totaled over two billion U.S. dollars. See Complaint at 17, In re Dynamic
Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 515629 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006).
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of U.S. commerce), as opposed to potentially narrower segments,
and relying on general quantitative observations (as opposed to
precise ones) to justify their holdings.
What does this mean for future antitrust litigants? As previously noted, the fact that courts have not relied on a precise metric
or set of metrics to determine whether the "substantial effects"
test has been met likely means that it is more difficult to predict a
court's end result (unless the case is at an extreme end of the spectrum). While some argue that less predictability (and more flexibility) is beneficial because it results in a higher deterrent effect,
others argue that over-deterrence and commensurate inefficiencies should be avoided at all costs and that more precise standards
should be formulated so as to provide businesses and individuals a
clear rule to follow. In any event, the current trend should give
foreign actors pause before engaging in behavior that could potentially inflict anticompetitive harm on U.S. commerce.
E.

Ramifications for the U.S.'s Neighbors in the
Americas

Beyond the general trend towards globalization, the countries
of North, Central and South America have become increasingly
interconnected. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that actions
taken anywhere in the Americas will result in anticompetitive
harm in the United States and therefore increases the risk that
entities throughout the Americas will be exposed to liability for
violating U.S. antitrust laws. Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s,
for example, many countries in Latin America began liberalizing
their economic policies, including their trade policies.224 This had
the effect of increasing trade between the United States and many
Latin American countries, especially those that entered into free
trade agreements with the United States. In fact, many such free
trade agreements include antitrust provisions designed to curtail
anticompetitive behavior in conjunction with liberalizing trade
practices.2 25
Beginning in the mid to late-1990s a few countries in the
Americas began entering into Antitrust Cooperation Agreements
with the United States.2 These countries include Mexico, Brazil
224. Sokol, supra note 11, at 237.
225. Id. at 242.
226. United States Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Cooperation

Agreements,

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/int-arrangements.htm

(last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
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and Canada.227 The stated purpose of these agreements is to
increase cooperation between the governments of the United
States and these countries with respect to antitrust issues, including antitrust enforcement.22 8 The agreements provide a framework pursuant to which antitrust enforcement agencies can work
cooperatively, including by working together and exchanging
information regarding investigations of alleged anticompetitive
conduct.2 29 In light of these agreements, there is a greater likelihood that businesses and individuals in the Americas will be prosecuted in the United States for anticompetitive acts substantially
affecting U.S. commerce.
Although relatively few enforcement actions appear to have
been brought against businesses and individuals in the Americas,
there is good reason to believe that the DOJ will become more
aggressive in prosecuting antitrust violations occurring abroad,
including throughout the Americas.
The Obama administration has announced that it intends to
aggressively enforce antitrust laws against international cartels.
While on the campaign trail, President Obama stated that "[als
president, I will direct my administration to reinvigorate antitrust
enforcement .... My administration will take aggressive action to
curb the growth of international cartels, working alone and with
other jurisdictions to ensure that firms, wherever located, that collude to harm American consumers are brought to justice."23" Addi-

tionally, the current economic downturn may make it more likely
that enforcement agencies will heighten their enforcement activities. First, as businesses struggle to survive, business executives
feel increasing pressure to maximize profits and this, in turn,
increases the possibility that they may engage in anticompetitive
activities. Second, because the lagging economy directly hurts
consumers, enforcement agencies like the DOJ are perhaps more
likely to aggressively pursue antitrust law violators who are causing further harm to already struggling consumers.

VI.

THOUGHTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Even in light of the significant legal scholarship in the inter227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American Antitrust Institute,
Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/aai-%20Presidential%
20campaign%20-%200bama%209-07 092720071759.pdf.
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national enforcement of domestic antitrust law," 1 there is still
much light to be shed by the academy. Given the dynamic legal
definition of substantial effects used throughout the Circuit
Courts of Appeal,232 a future study may attempt to quantify a
threshold level of injury requisite for a federal court to grant jurisdiction for an antitrust claim made against a foreign defendant.
The legal world produces vast amounts of data, including detailed
written opinions, reviews by legislators, expert witness reports,
and settlements. 233 A quantitative analysis might seek to calculate whether, for example, a court's decision to grant jurisdiction
is affected where twenty percent of a U.S.-based corporation's
profits are adversely affected by a foreign corporation's anticompetitive conduct.
As we have seen, the courts have addressed the issue of determining the existence of a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on a case-by-case basis and have not promulgated
any distinct test.234 An empirical legal study could offer meaningful insight into the legal definition of "foreseeable" effects235 by
classifying the adverse financial effect required to create subject
matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA. 23 6 The study might then

consider whether the heightened costs in preparing for litigation
curtails anticompetitive conduct abroad.
Future research may also consider studies on the international enforcement of cartels.237 It is difficult to obtain reliable
231. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 449; Tuttle, supra note 32, at 345; Note,
supra note 18, at 2127; Brockbank, supra note 47, at 21.
232. See discussion supra Part IV.
233. Lee Epstein & Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal
Scholarship: The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20 (2002).
234. Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland, ExtraterritorialApplication of
U.S. Antitrust Law: What Is a "Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable
Effect" Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 11,
18 (2003).
235. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 795-96.
236. See McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that injury exclusively to customers or potential customers located in a
foreign nation and consequential injury to one U.S. export company was not sufficient
for extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA).
237. See, e.g., Andrew R. Dick, When are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J. LAw &
EcoN. 241, 248 (1996) ("Researchers typically have emphasized price-fixing as the
primary motive for export cartels' formation."); Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust,
and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 517 (2004) ("Cartels are a focus of concern for
many reasons. Cartels cause allocative inefficiency by reducing production in order to
raise market price. This forces consumers to pay significantly more money for
products, from luxuries like high-end art to necessities like vitamins and
pharmaceuticals .... Cartels may also create productive inefficiencies when they
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data on cartels, particularly those that are not prosecuted."' The
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Policy ("Amnesty Program") is the Department's most effective generator of cartel cases and is believed to be the most
successful program in U.S. history for detecting significant commercial crimes. 9 Information gathered through the Amnesty
Program could offer a unique glimpse not only into the smokedfilled rooms of price cartels, but also at the effects of international
2 40
enforcement efforts on the ability to maintain the cartel.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There has been a meaningful shift in the expanse of extraterritorial U.S. antitrust jurisdiction throughout the latter half of the
modern century. Trade between the Americas continues to grow
at exponential rates. Domestic consumers and exporters alike
face heightened risk of economic disenfranchisement from
anticompetitive action committed abroad. There is a clear and
pressing need for a unified, unwavering response from U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies. At the same time, domestic regulators must pay homage to foreign sovereignty and international
comity.
There are understandably divergent interests among developed and developing nations. Some favor laws aimed at stimulating economic growth at home, even to the detriment of trade
partners. Others maintain strict rules regulating anticompetitive
infractions. Extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction is ultimately a derivative of a combination of foreign trade
laws. As the clock continues to tick, winding around the parameters of an open-market, capitalistic society, the United States is
protect inefficient manufacturers, thus increasing the average production costs in an
industry.").
238. Mehra, supra note 75, at 359.
239. Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for
Reporting Violations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 799 (2001) ("Over the past five
years, the Amnesty Program has been responsible for detecting and prosecuting more
antitrust violations than all of [the Antitrust Division's] search warrants, consensualmonitored audio or video tapes, and cooperating informants combined. It is,
unquestionably, the single greatest investigative tool available to anti-cartel
enforcers.") (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Status Report: Corporate Leniency Program
(2001)).
240. Leslie, supra note 237, at 517 (noting that cartels are inherently unstable
because a cartel's continued existence is based on trust: each participant must trust
its cartel partners not to cheat on the agreement by charging less than the fixed price
or tell antitrust authorities about the cartel).
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poised to continue it role as global cop, enforcing a decree against
antitrust conduct. Still dangling above remains a largely undefined notion of substantial effects.

